Recently, a smart card based authentication and key agreement scheme preserving the user anonymity was proposed by Wang, Juang and Lei, that is designed to provide users with secure activities in ubiquitous computing environments. The authors proved that their scheme delivers important security properties and functionalities, such as without maintaining password/verification tables, freedom on password selection and alteration, mutual authentication, user anonymity, no time synchronization problem, key agreement implementation, forgery attack resistance and computation efficiency. However, we show that Wang et al.'s scheme has potential security flaws, which enable malicious attackers to counterfeit an application server to spoof the victim client and damage the security of session key and the property of user anonymity. In this paper, we propose an enhanced version of Wang et al.'s scheme to remedy these flaws. The proposed scheme not only ensures the merits of their scheme but also enhances the security of their scheme without raising any computation cost.
Introduction
The movement towards ubiquitous computing environment has raised a number of security concerns among the remote application servers and the login clients. At any time and any place, a client can access the desired services from an application server by using his/her mobile devices such as PDA, laptop and smart phone etc. Remote user authentication based on easy-to-remember passwords over insecure networks is the conventional method of authentication and has already been accepted warmly. An application server is responsible for managing and supplying network services to login clients for which password authentication schemes have been provided during a login request. A number of relevant researches and authentication mechanisms have been investigated in recent three decades and the key concepts include:
1. Without maintaining verification or password tables in server side to prevent stolen verifier attacks [5, 7] . 2. Using a smart card to help clients to remember secret information [3] . 3. Users can freely choose and change passwords [2] . 4 . Resistance to password disclosure to any other users [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] .
5. Using a nonce-based mechanism to prevent time synchronization problem [9, 13] . 6. Resistance to replay, modification, parallel session [4] and password guessing attacks [14] . 7. Protect the system against impersonation attacks on both the user and the server side [1, 16] . 8. Low communication cost and computation complexity. 9. Achieve mutual authentication and key agreement implementation between login users and remote servers [10, 12, 15] . 10 . Prevention of smart card security breach attacks.
Note that secret information stored in a smart card can be extracted by analyzing and monitoring its power consumption [6, 20] . 11. Revocation of smart card in case of stolen or smart card loss problems [25] . 12. Provision of user anonymity and the client's identity and location cannot be traced by any users over public networks [8, 11, 23, 25] .
Recently, Wang et al. proposed a security enhancement on two efficient remote user authentication schemes using smart cards [24] . Remote user authentication scheme is a very important mechanism in distributed computer network systems for preventing unauthorized network access. Many remote user authentication schemes have been proposed using smart cards because of the low cost. In 2011, Wang et al. [25] found that the Wang et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to the known-key attack and the smart card loss problem. To remedy these weaknesses, they proposed an improvement on the Wang et al.'s scheme. However, we found that the Wang et al.'s scheme is still vulnerable to two kinds of sever counterfeit attacks and thus damage the security of session key. To resolve these security problems, we propose an enhanced version of Wang et al.'s scheme in this paper. The proposed scheme not only inherits the advantages of their scheme but also enhances the security of their scheme without raising any computation cost.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. A brief review of the Wang et al.'s scheme is given in Section 2. We analyze their scheme to show their security flaws in Section 3. In Section 4, we propose our improved scheme and the security analysis of the proposed scheme are presented in Section 5. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 6.
A Review of Wang et al.'s scheme
Recently, Wang et al. proposed a robust authentication and key agreement scheme preserving the user anonymity [25] . There are seven phases in their scheme which includes registration, precomputation, authentication and key agreement, password change, revoking smart card, user eviction and user anonymity phase. For convenience of description, terminology and notations used in the paper are summarized as follows: -id i : the identity of a client i. In the following subsections, we briefly review Wang et al.'s scheme.
Registration Phase
In this phase, all the communications between the client i and the application server S are through a secure channel. 1. Client i chooses the identity id i and sends it to the application server S. 
Precomputation Phase
Before the client i starts to access the application server, the smart card computes T 1 = R × G as a point over E p and stores T 1 into its memory for using in the authentication and key agreement phase.
Authentication and Key Agreement Phase
When client i intends to login S, the client attaches his/her smart card into the card reader and inputs the password pw i . Then, the smart card and the remote application server perform the following steps:
On receiving the login request from client i, S checks its ID table to verify the validity of client i's id i and checks if computed
|| K) and T 3 = W × G and sends (T 3 , V 1 ) back to the smart card, where W is a random number in Z n * . 3. On receiving the response message from S, the smart card checks if computed
. If it matches, the client i successfully authenticates S and sends a response
If it holds, S successfully authenticates the client i. 4. The value K = h(R×W×G) = K' computed by the client and the application server can be used as the session key for securing future communications.
Password Change Phase
When the client i wants to change his/her password pw i with a new password new pwi , the client inserts his/her smart card into the card reader and enters the original and new passwords. Then, the smart card computes
and replaces B i ' with B i ". Now, the client i's new password new pwi is successfully changed and this phase is finished.
Revoking Smart Card Phase
In case of stolen or lost smart card, there should be provision in the scheme for revoking the illegal use of stolen or lost smart card and the client should notify the application server of the revocation. Then smart card and the remote application server perform the following steps: 1. S generates the identity of a new smart card cid inew , computes 
User Eviction Phase
In case of a client is evicted by the application server, S can delete (id i , cid i ) from its ID table and the client cannot use (id i , cid i ) to login the application server anymore.
User Anonymity Phase
In Wang et al.'s scheme, authors extend their scheme to provide the user anonymity and the user's identity and location cannot be traced by any users over public networks. We briefly review Wang et al.'s scheme with user anonymity as follows: 1. In the registration phase, the client i sends a registered information to the application server and the server stores (IND i , B 
Cryptanalysis of Wang et al.'s Scheme
In this section, we show that two kinds of server counterfeit attacks and the session key cryptanalysis attack exist in Wang et al.'s scheme [25] .
Server Counterfeit Attack I
In server counterfeit attack I, a legal but malicious client (or attacker) can easily apply a valid smart card and extract the secret information G and E p from this applied smart card by monitoring its power consumption [6, 20] . Since the secret information G and E p are concurrently used for all clients and this design helps the attacker to counterfeit an application server to spoof the victim client. We briefly describe this attack as follows: 1. In Step 1 of the authentication and key agreement phase, the attacker intercepts a login request (id i , T 1 , T 2 ) sent by a victim client. 2. Upon intercepting the login request (id i , T 1 , T 2 ), the attacker selects a random number W' in Z n * and computes a fake response (T 3 " = W'×G, V 1 " =h(T 2 ||K"), where K" = h(W' × T 1 ). Then the attacker sends (T 3 ", V 1 ") back to the victim client. 3. Upon receiving the response (T 3 ", V 1 ") from the attacker, the victim client's smart card checks if computed
. Obviously, the value
is the same as the attacker's value
and the verification will pass. Therefore, the victim client believes that he/she currently communicates with a legal application server and sends a reply V 2 = h(R × B i ||K' + 1) back to the attacker. Of course, the attacker will ignore and discard this response. Hence, Wang et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to server counterfeit attack I.
Server Counterfeit Attack II
In server counterfeit attack II, we demonstrate that Wang et al.'s scheme with user anonymity cannot defend against the server counterfeit attack. We assume that the attacker can get the secret information G and 
Session Key Cryptanalysis Attack
According to Section 3.1, the attacker can easily counterfeit a legal but malicious server and maliciously communicate with the victim client. After abovementioned steps of server counterfeit attack I are finished, the attacker and the victim client compute the same session key K' = K" and the attacker can employ K" to launch a malevolent communication later.
Similarly, according to Section 3.2, the attacker and the victim client compute the same session key K 1 ' = K 1 " and the attacker can employ K 1 " to launch a malevolent communication later.
The Proposed Scheme
To overcome the above-mentioned attacks, we propose an improvement on Wang et al.'s scheme in this section. In our proposed scheme, the registration, precomputation, password change, revoking smart card and user eviction phases are the same as those in Wang et al.'s scheme. The main differences in the authentication and key agreement and user anonymity phases are briefly described in the following subsections. 
Authentication and Key Agreement Phase
Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of the proposed scheme and demonstrate its strength in terms of security. The proposed scheme is a modified form of Wang et al.'s scheme and we only discuss the improved security features of the proposed scheme.
Server Counterfeit Attack I Resistance
In Step 2 of the authentication and key agreement phase, the attacker needs to reply V 1 = h(h(x||id i ||cid i )×G||K" = h(W' × T 1 )) and T 3 = W' × G to the client for verification, where W' is a random number chosen by the attacker. However, without knowing the server's master key x and the client's secret information h(x||id i ||cid i )×G, it is difficult for the attacker to fake a correct K". Thus the attacker cannot counterfeit a legal server to reply a correct hash value V 1 to convince the client. Moreover, when a response of previous session is revealed or eavesdropped by an attacker, it is difficult for him/her to derive server's master key x and the client's secret information h(x||id i ||cid i )×G because these two values are wellprotected under the adoption of one-way hashing function. Therefore, the proposed system is secure against server counterfeit attack I.
Server Counterfeit Attack II Resistance
For our scheme with user anonymity, if the attacker intends to counterfeit a legal server, the attacker needs to compute a symmetric encryption key K 1 " = h(W' × T 1 ) with an encrypted response V 1 = E K1" [h(h(x||IND i ||cid i )×G +1)||IND ifake ||B ifake ] and replies (V 1 , T 3 = W' × G) to the client for verification, where W' is a random number chosen by the attacker. However, the server's master key x and the client's secret information h(x||IND i ||cid i )×G are securely protected by the server and the client, respectively. It means that the attacker cannot fake a correct V 1 with K 1 " and nobody can counterfeit a legal server to deceive other ones. Therefore, the resistance to server counterfeit attack II can be guaranteed in our user anonymity scheme.
Security of Session Key
As shown in the authentication and key agreement phase, the client and the server agree a common session key K = h(R×W×G) = K' and they can use the session key to secure the transmitting messages in the rest of the communication.
For security of session key, even if an attacker can obtain the client's contribution T 1 = R × G and the server's contribution T 3 = W × G, the attacker still cannot derive the common session key K = h(R×W×G) = K' because to do this is as difficult as solving the Elliptic curve computational Diffie-Hellman problem.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have showed security vulnerabilities on two Wang et al.'s password authentication schemes. By intercepting a victim client's login request, a malicious attacker can counterfeit an application server to spoof this victim client, endanger the security of key agreement, and damage the property of user anonymity. To resist these security threats found in their schemes, we have developed two enhanced password authentication schemes. Security analysis shows that two enhanced schemes not only inherit the merits of Wang et al.'s schemes but also enhance the security of Wang et al.'s schemes.
